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 Summary (100 words) 
 
A century before bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Great Britain and North 
America grappled with an equally maddening disease in cattle: pleuro-pneumonia.  The 
subject of a decades-long trade dispute in the nineteenth-century transatlantic region, pleuro-
pneumonia attracted the attention of livestock farmers, diplomats, shipping moguls, 
veterinarians, public health regulators, and journalists.  Scientific controversy aggravated the 
dispute; veterinary officials elaborated scientific opinions and regulatory orders amidst a 
prevailing confusion about microbiology and disease diagnostics.  In this context emerged 
William Williams, an Edinburgh-based professor whose convictions spawned repeated 
disagreements with the British government’s diagnoses of pleuro-pneumonia in cattle from 
the United States and Canada. 
 
In the autumn of 1890 Robert Wallace, professor of agriculture and rural economy at the University 
of Edinburgh, delivered a lecture to students gathered to learn about the transatlantic livestock and 
meat trade.  Steering his comments to what he termed ‘the burning question of the moment,’ 
Professor Wallace addressed whether or not United States (US) cattle should be freely admitted ‘not 
only as butchers’ cattle, but as stores to be finally finished for the fat market’ [1].  At issue was the 
continuation of an eleven-year-old disease-control policy requiring, upon debarkation at ports of 
entry, the immediate slaughter of US cattle.  The Privy Council had adopted an immediate-slaughter 
order in 1879 after government inspectors diagnosed US cattle landed at Liverpool with pleuro-
pneumonia, an insidious lung disease that for decades had plagued British livestock raisers with 
losses numbering in the millions of pounds [2][3].  Proceeding with his lecture, Professor Wallace 
acknowledged disagreement regarding the Privy Council veterinary authorities’ diagnoses and, by 
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 extension, doubts that the policy was truly necessary—a question raised by American interests as 
well as Scottish livestock farmers eager to import US ‘store cattle’ for inland finishing, sale, and 
slaughter.  ‘I am quite aware,’ Professor Wallace told his students, ‘that there is an impression in 
America that our inspectors have mistaken the appearances of pleuro-pneumonia for those present 
in the lungs of cattle suffering from a sporadic inflammation’ [1].  This very impression had been 
embraced by not only American veterinary scientists but, significantly, one of Wallace’s 
contemporaries in Edinburgh.  For more than a decade, Professor William Williams, Principal of the 
New Veterinary College in Edinburgh, had vehemently disagreed with the Privy Council Veterinary 
Department inspectors’ diagnoses of pleuro-pneumonia in American cattle.  Williams’s 
involvement in transatlantic squabbling over pleuro-pneumonia began at the genesis of the dispute 
itself—in January 1879 at the Liverpool docks. 
 
Birth of the dispute at Merseyside in January 1879 
  Early in January 1879, the steamship Ontario, loaded with over 200 North American cattle, 
departed from Portland, Maine.  The shipment—originally sourced from markets as far afield as 
Chicago, Buffalo, and Toronto—featured mostly US animals [4].  As the Ontario trekked eastward 
in cold Atlantic waters, veterinary authorities in London and Liverpool were busily stepping up 
enforcement of a new Foreign Animals Order.  Promulgated under the Contagious Diseases 
(Animals) Act of 1878, the order stipulated that as a general rule, with certain exceptions, livestock 
imports were to be slaughtered immediately upon arrival (by rule, within 10 days).  Significant for 
the approaching Ontario shipment, the new order conditionally exempted US and Canadian 
livestock imports; North American animals were to be permitted inland alive provided that upon 
importation they were inspected and certified as disease-free [3].  Within the British, American, and 
 3
 Canadian veterinary communities, scientists speculated for how long US cattle imports would enjoy 
exemption from the compulsory-slaughter policy.  George Fleming, who not infrequently wrote on 
behalf of the British veterinary elite [5], had six months earlier urged the immediate slaughter of US 
cattle imports, referring to the prevalence of pleuro-pneumonia there [6].  In a widely-referenced 
report James Law, a professor at New York’s Cornell University, had confirmed the existence of 
pleuro-pneumonia in several locales along the US eastern seaboard [7][4].  Meanwhile, a Canadian 
scientist carrying out investigations in the eastern US shared his pleuro-pneumonia discoveries with 
British authorities [4].  Such reports did not bode well for those invested in the lucrative trade in 
American store cattle.  Those involved in the ‘store’ trade at Liverpool and other British ports 
responsible for receiving North American cattle feared the immediate-slaughter spectre.  American 
and British businessmen alike believed that ending live importation would reduce Britain’s supply 
of meat and raise prices.  Others feared that in over-stocked markets compulsory slaughter within 
10 days would impair their ability to hold animals until prices recovered [8]. 
On Sunday, 26 January 1879, the Ontario arrived into port at Liverpool.  Slightly less than 
200 cattle, two of which were dead, were landed.  The Veterinary Inspector for the Local Authority 
of Liverpool examined the lungs of one of the dead animals and suspected pleuro-pneumonia.  
Consistent with Privy Council orders, the inspector excised and forwarded portions of the lungs to 
the Veterinary Department of the Privy Council in London.  The London-based authorities 
confirmed the diagnosis.  Professor George Brown, head of the Department, ordered the detainment 
of the remaining animals from the Ontario shipment [9].  The Duke of Richmond, Lord President of 
the Privy Council, directed Professor Brown to send one of his inspectors to Liverpool to oversee 
the slaughter and inspection of the entire Ontario cargo [9][10].  
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 To accommodate the slaughter and inspection of such a large number of cattle, the Ontario 
animals were transferred on Wednesday, 29 January, to a nearby abattoir.  After slaughter, the Privy 
Council veterinary authorities noticed that a considerable number of the cattle had respiratory 
inflammations in consequence of exposure to cold weather. The inspectors also found ‘the 
distinctive appearances of pleuro-pneumonia’ in the lungs of 12 animals [9].  The next day the 
British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, announced by telegram that on account of detecting 
pleuro-pneumonia among the Ontario shipment, the British government was reconsidering its 
exemption of US cattle from compulsory slaughter [4].  On Saturday, 1 February, The New York 
Times reported ‘alarm and anxiety’ in the transatlantic livestock-trading community [11].  US 
regulatory authorities haphazardly endeavoured to rescue embarrassed livestock exporters; US 
Treasury Secretary John Sherman quickly elaborated the semblance of an inspection-and-
certification program, and US Commissioner of Agriculture William G. Le Duc sent two of his 
correspondents to conduct inspection and certification activities at New York ports and Chicago 
stockyards [12].  Not only had Secretary Sherman and Commissioner Le Duc acted without 
consulting each other, they had acted too late.  Even though shipments of American cattle would 
arrive into Liverpool in healthy condition over the next several days [4], the diagnosis of pleuro-
pneumonia in the Ontario shipment had all but guaranteed that US cattle would soon be subject to 
immediate slaughter.  Continued exemption of US cattle would require especially compelling 
arguments. US exporters and diplomats offered one, with Professor William Williams supplying a 
supportive scientific opinion. 
In The New York Times, shipping mogul Timothy Eastman conceded that pleuro-pneumonia 
existed in certain locales along the American east coast, but he doubted the diagnosis of pleuro-
pneumonia in the Ontario shipment.  Eastman insisted that pleuro-pneumonia was entirely confined 
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 to eastern dairies and did not threaten export cattle, which (based on his experience) were sourced 
from the western states [13][11].  Commissioner Le Duc and veterinary leaders in the US perceived 
the fragility of Eastman’s argument [14].  Nevertheless, as allegations emerged that the British 
veterinary authorities had erred in their diagnosis, US officials embraced Eastman’s line of thinking.  
Moreover, additional reports—one citing the Liverpool Cattle Trade Association—seemed to bear 
out Eastman’s suggestion that the animals aboard the Ontario had simply ‘caught cold’ [11]; 
conventional bronchitis, not pleuro-pneumonia, appeared to be the problem aboard the Ontario [14].  
As Eastman intimated that the Privy Council inspectorate was wrong, Liverpuldian importers called 
in ‘veterinary surgeons of high repute, to act as a check upon the Privy Council Inspectors’ [11].  
The consultants were the principals of the three veterinary colleges in Scotland: James McCall of 
the Glasgow Veterinary College, Thomas Walley of Edinburgh's Royal (Dick) Veterinary College, 
and William Williams of Edinburgh's New Veterinary College.  Walley, who was accompanied by 
McCall, observed several of the detained Ontario cattle coughing and, after viewing the lungs of 
two slaughtered animals, saw ‘without a doubt’ the lesions of pleuro-pneumonia.  Williams also 
saw the animals before and after slaughter, but he diagnosed the suspect animals with conventional 
bronchitis, not pleuro-pneumonia [9][10].   
In early February the inevitable occurred: on the basis of its Veterinary Department’s 
diagnoses, the Privy Council ordered that effective 3 March, US cattle would no longer be 
exempted from compulsory slaughter [4].  The transatlantic veterinary community was immediately 
engrossed in a heated debate.  In March 1879, writing from his veterinary college at Gayfield 
House, Williams penned a letter to a colleague in New York. In the letter, which weeks later 
surfaced in The New York Times, Williams reported that he found merely bronchitis after examining 
‘the lungs said by Privy Council Inspectors to have pleuro-pneumonia.’ Referring to lung specimens 
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 from the implicated animals, he concluded, ‘I have the specimens most carefully preserved, and am 
ready to show them to the whole world, and his wife, if necessary’ [15]. 
 
Conviction and Controversy 
Professor Williams widely displayed his opinions as well as his collected lung specimens.  
Williams, who in May 1879 assumed the presidency of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons 
[5], was fast becoming an internationally sought-after scientific consultant [16].  Coloured plates of 
Williams’s specimens appeared in his internationally acclaimed textbook, The Principles and 
Practice of Veterinary Medicine.  The preface to his second edition, originally authored in 
September 1879 but reprinted in subsequent editions, was devoted to the pleuro-pneumonia dispute: 
The existence and characteristics of Pleuro-Pneumonia Contagiosa and Bronchitis 
...were lately the subject of differences of opinion between the Veterinary Officers of 
the Privy Council and the Author, in connection with the alleged existence of Pleuro 
against American Cattle imported into this country, and slaughtered at Liverpool to 
prevent contagion...The Author does not deny the existence of Pleuro in some of the 
Eastern States of America, but it has not yet been proved that this contagious malady 
prevails in the Western States, from whence cattle are brought to this country.  Of 
this, however, he is confident, that in none of the diseased lungs of the cattle referred 
to did he find the characteristics of Contagious Pleuro; but, in all, those of Bronchitis 
[17]. 
 
A Member of Parliament would give public voice to Williams's insistence that the British 
authorities had made a ‘gross mistake’ in diagnosing American cattle with pleuro-pneumonia [18].  
Many in America doubted the British authorities’ diagnoses, and Professor Williams clearly offered 
them an invaluable, British voice in the debate.   
In January 1880, US Commissioner of Agriculture William Le Duc hired Dr. Charles 
Lyman of Harvard University to re-evaluate the prevalence of pleuro-pneumonia in the US.  When 
Lyman reported to Le Duc in April, he confirmed that pleuro-pneumonia still persisted in several 
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 eastern states, but he emphasized that the west had yet avoided the scourge.  Lyman explained that 
after examining hundreds of lungs from western cattle he had detected no signs of pleuro-
pneumonia [9].  Dr. Lyman’s report cemented his favour with Commissioner Le Duc, and American 
zeal grew for the ‘disease-free west’ argument—that is, the contention that American cattle sourced 
west of the Allegheny Mountains were of no pleuro-pneumonia threat to Britain.  In June, Le Duc 
instructed Lyman to head to Britain and to inspect for himself the US cattle being landed at 
Liverpool and London [9]. 
On 4 July 1880, Lyman arrived at Liverpool and proceeded directly to Gayfield House in 
Edinburgh to confer with Professor Williams.  Williams explained to Lyman that he had travelled to 
Liverpool on several occasions, beginning with the Privy Council’s initial condemnation of 
American cattle aboard the Ontario in January 1879.  Williams also recounted how, in the six 
months following, he had acquired and examined lung samples from three-fourths of the American 
cattle diagnosed in Liverpool as having had pleuro-pneumonia.  Williams, who still had several of 
these samples, showed them to Lyman, explaining that they did not indicate pleuro-pneumonia but 
rather conventional bronchitis [9].  Lyman, seeking to secure a range of opinions, left Gayfield 
House and paid visit to Thomas Walley, Principal of Edinburgh’s Royal (Dick) Veterinary College 
and another of the three veterinarians who had been called down to Liverpool in the aftermath of the 
Ontario incident.  Walley himself had recently published a book on cattle diseases, including 
pleuro-pneumonia.  In the post-script to his book, Walley had voiced support for the immediate-
slaughter treatment of American cattle, although he remained open to the ‘disease-free west’ 
argument [19].  During Lyman’s visit, Walley reiterated his concurrence with the Privy Council 
Veterinary Department’s diagnosis of pleuro-pneumonia in the Ontario shipment.  However, 
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 Walley shared that he had in fact seen other samples, also taken from American cattle condemned at 
Liverpool, that were not pleuro-pneumonia [9]. 
Dr. Lyman continued his mission.  Satisfied with the information gleaned from Williams 
and Walley in Edinburgh, he proceeded to London and the Veterinary Department of the Privy 
Council.  There Lyman met with both Professor George Brown, head of the Department, and Mr. 
A.C. Cope, the chief inspector.  Dr. Lyman put the ‘disease-free west’ argument to Professor 
Brown, who flatly replied that the US did not have the regulatory infrastructure to guarantee such a 
claim.  Lyman insisted that the various state and railroad authorities could ensure safe passage and 
that federal inspection at the ports was adequate.  Brown was unmoved.  While at the Veterinary 
Department, Lyman was also shown several lung samples of ‘American pleuro’.  Preserved in fluid, 
the specimens exhibited the signs of contagious pleuro-pneumonia but were, according to Lyman, 
very different from those he had seen in Williams’s collection.  Aware of Lyman’s scepticism, Cope 
encouraged Lyman to visit the ports of Liverpool and Deptford, where Privy Council authorities 
could show him more samples.  Dr. Lyman spent July and August 1880 at these locales, 
accompanying Privy Council veterinary inspectors in their supervision of US cattle imports.  During 
Lyman’s time in Liverpool, Privy Council inspectors examined 10,670 animals, six of which were 
found to have pleuro-pneumonia [9].  Lyman doubted that the disease was in fact pleuro-
pneumonia, but he refused to accuse the British authorities of deliberate intrigue.  Yet Lyman and 
others in Washington continued to point to William Williams’s contentions that the Privy Council 
was mistaking pleuro-pneumonia for bronchitis.  One of Lyman’s reports was followed by a six-
page chapter, authored by Professor Williams, for the US Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Agriculture [20]. 
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 Professor Williams's never-ending disagreement with the British government's diagnosis 
was but one episode in a larger context in which microbiological science was still unfolding.  
Disputation over pleuro-pneumonia was exacerbated by the infancy in which modern 
microbiological science found itself.  Spontaneous-generation explanations of disease had largely 
been discarded on the basis of Louis Pasteur’s experiments (1861) and Robert Koch’s validation of 
the germ theory of disease (1876), but Pasteur’s and Koch’s ideas were nonetheless new.  While 
Pasteur’s experiments are most celebrated, the spontaneous-generation theory was finally 
discredited in 1876 and 1877 by Tyndall’s and Cohn’s experiments, which described bacterial and 
spore heat resistance.  Although he used the principles in his 1876 anthrax experiments, not until 
1884 and his etiological study of tuberculosis would Koch formally elaborate his famous ‘Koch's 
Postulates’ [21][22].  The novelty of Koch’s and Pasteur’s discoveries was evident in the American 
and British veterinary community during the 1870s; late in the decade, both Thomas Walley and 
James Law took the time to refute spontaneous-generation arguments [19][4]. 
Nevertheless, the pleuro-pneumonia dispute was dominated not by debates about 
spontaneous generation or the germ theory; veterinarians understood pleuro-pneumonia was a 
contagious disease.  Fleming, Williams, and Walley agreed that it was some sort of contagion, but 
the precise nature of the etiological agent would remain a mystery until 1898 [23].  As a practical 
matter, microbiological analyses were not routinely used to diagnose pleuro-pneumonia.  As Dr. 
Lyman learned in Liverpool during the summer of 1880, British inspectors would conduct an ante-
mortem inspection, singling out live American cattle suspicious of pleuro-pneumonia.  After 
passing ante-mortem inspection, the entire cargo would be slaughtered according to the 
compulsory-slaughter order, and a post-mortem inspection of the lungs followed.  The inspector 
looked for certain visible lesions and symptoms [9].  As Dr. Lyman discovered from comparing 
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 Williams’s specimens in Edinburgh to those at the Privy Council Veterinary Department, such 
visual inspection left dangerous room for interpretation.  Pleuro-pneumonia, a disease with visible 
symptoms similar to non-contagious and less fatal respiratory diseases, was a likely candidate for 
disease-diagnosis confusion, particularly in cattle that underwent stressful transoceanic conditions.  
Given the absence of clear etiological science, it is understandable that Professor Williams and 
North American officials would so frequently insist that the British government had mistaken 
pleuro-pneumonia for conventional bronchitis [2].  In addition to diagnosis difficulties, the long 
incubation period of pleuro-pneumonia sowed further opportunities for confusion by masking actual 
cases of infection.   
 
Conclusion and Epilogue 
Given the disease-diagnosis fog surrounding pleuro-pneumonia, it is indeed possible 
(although not clear) that Williams was right; Professor Brown and his team of inspectors may have 
incorrectly diagnosed US cattle with pleuro-pneumonia.  In any case, Professor Williams’s 
arguments, while unique in Britain, were not entirely far-fetched and, in retrospect, signal the mettle 
of a scientist willing to publicise his convictions.  In addition to American veterinarians and 
diplomats, Canadian officials benefited from Williams’s convictions; when Canada lost is pleuro-
pneumonia-free status in 1892, Professor Williams returned to challenge the British diagnoses.  
Alongside Williams’s contestation of the British authorities’ diagnoses stood the US government’s 
‘disease-free west’ argument, which the British government continued to reject.  Dr. Lyman joined 
his American colleagues in doubting the correctness of the British authorities’ diagnoses, but he 
understood the larger, more important matter: Britain's immediate-slaughter order for American 
cattle was based on the absence of a robust US regulatory system.  Lyman and other American 
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 public health pioneers urged Congress to rectify this problem.  These appeals, coupled with a 
growing appreciation in America of the risks posed by pleuro-pneumonia, prompted federal action 
and the eventual eradication of pleuro-pneumonia in 1892.  Until the end of the nineteenth century, 
US diplomats continued to challenge Britain’s immediate-slaughter rule.  However, changes in the 
economic landscape soon made the matter less of an American preoccupation.  After 1900, 
increasing demand for beef in the US made British markets less critical for American traders [8].  
This new economic reality effectively resolved the dispute. 
On 12 November 1900, Professor Williams passed away.  In one tribute, Williams was 
affirmed for the legitimacy of his scientific convictions, held for decades amidst the fires of 
controversy: 
The principal was a man whom no consideration could cause to swerve from what he 
considered just and right, and in the matter of public appointments he suffered greatly 
from the determined position which he took up against the Government veterinary 
authorities...in regard to the so-called pleuro-pneumonia in...cattle, the Principal 
holding that the malady in question was not pleuro at all, but was neither more nor 
less than broncho-pneumonia, which is non-contagious in character [24]. 
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